National Security and Intelligence Commitments in the Programme for Government – A Quick Reaction

 

The commitments to reviewing and developing Ireland’s national security architecture and intelligence capabilities are very welcome. This quick reaction piece initially outlines three threats to Ireland’s security and then analyses the government’s responses as articulated in the programme for government.

 

Threats

The 2024 Defence Policy Review was unambiguous – Ireland is experiencing a period of profound change in its security environment. Consequently, the reform and enhancement of national intelligence structures / capabilities is now essential.

The threats to Irish security are both complex and diverse, including:

• Violent Extremism
• Foreign Interference
• Espionage

Violent Extremism

Faith-Motivated Violent Extremism is on the rise in the EU; extremists are employing atrocities in Gaza and Lebanon to advance their violent ideologies and plan attacks. The attack on a Defence Forces’ chaplain in Galway in August of this year by a teenager – allegedly exposed to online disinformation – underlines the heightened risk of online radicalisation.

Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism is also a significant threat in Ireland, as it is elsewhere in Europe. Far-right extremists draw upon international networks, including on sites like Telegram, to spread violent ideologies and conspiracy theories targeting ethnic minorities and public figures. Some of the leaders of recent violent protests have drawn upon white-nationalist ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracies, adding language such as ‘plantation’, to target ethnic minorities, including international protection applicants.

Foreign Interference

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has warned that member states face a clear choice – “Do we want a strong Europe that fights for our values and our democracy? Or, on the other hand, do we let our democracies be hijacked by the proxies and puppets of authoritarians?” Within the EU the scale and threat of interference by illiberal foreign states to shift political or cultural views is especially acute during the lead-up to elections. Government websites may be attacked, and state-sponsored disinformation – such as that propagated by the Russian Federation during the recent European Parliament elections – may undermine public trust in democratic institutions. Foreign intelligence services may also attempt to manipulate ethnic minority communities, suppressing their freedom of association and expression, or establishing front organisations to mobilise opinion to advance a foreign state’s interests. The potential for social media networks, such as those controlled by Elon Musk, to deliberately spread disinformation or foment extremism is also readily apparent.

Espionage

Ireland’s economic transformation means that it is exposed to an increased risk of industrial espionage. Foreign states may seek to steal proprietary technology or intellectual property to gain an advantage for their own industries and/or military and intelligence capabilities. The European Commission has warned that research institutions, including universities, are at increased risk. Ireland is a communications hub, a global leader in data hosting and services, as well as hosting a significant part of the subsea, transatlantic cable network.

 

The Response – The Programme for Government

• An increase in the coordination role of the Department of the Taoiseach / establish a new National Security Committee to meet regularly, chaired by the Taoiseach and comprised of the Tánaiste, the Minister for Justice and Minister for Defence

Comment: Other ministers/officials may also attend from time to time in relation to the protection of critical national infrastructure. But a lean approach to this committee, limiting this committee to ministers and officials with principal roles / responsibility for national security is to be welcomed.

• Examine the existing national security structures and consider how they can be further strengthened and complete this work within six months.

Comment: A review is very welcome. Other countries have found such reviews to be beneficial in strategically resetting their national security policies and architecture to address evolving threats. The appointment in New Zealand in 2015 of two eminent chairpersons, Michael Cullen and Patsy Reddy (both with past diverse experiences of politics, government and the private sector) to review New Zealand’s security and intelligence structures ultimately led to a groundbreaking report, widely praised for its realistic, yet ambitious, series of recommendations. Balancing independent (including international) expertise and knowledge of context is key. A review should consider, among other things, scaling up vetting / counter-intelligence capabilities, the introduction of an all-source intelligence instrument at the centre of government to inform policy.

The Fianna Fáil manifesto included an ambitious proposal to establish a separate security intelligence service – essentially moving primacy for security intelligence out of the Garda National Crime & Security Intelligence Service. This is one option that could be assessed; another is to consider a Criminal Assets Bureau-type model for security intelligence. CAB is an independent statutory body, with a range of Garda and civilian personnel with distinctive expertise, but still closely attached (and responsible to) An Garda Síochána.

• Prepare a revised National Security Strategy.

Comment: Overdue and vital – the National Security Strategy has been many years in the making. It should be updated to reflect the shift, escalation of security threats and changed geopolitical landscape since 2022. Sequencing is important here. A national security review should precede, and help inform, an updated NSS – but both should be completed within the first year of the government’s term of office.

• Bring the National Centre for Cyber Security and the National Security Authority under the remit of the Department of Justice to ensure proper alignment of national security infrastructure.

Comment: What is the National Security Authority? The NSA was established in 1998 to put in place minimum standards for the protection of EU classified information. The lead for the NSA was vested in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Shifting this to the Department of Justice is a logical, overdue, step – especially as the government seeks to rapidly increase its capacity to carry out vetting (including developed vetting for those handling material marked as especially secret or sensitive) of individuals working in public and private sector roles deemed sensitive to national security.

Moving the National Cyber Security Centre to the Department of Justice is also a sensible move to enhance its national security function – and to augment its interoperability with An Garda Síochána, among other agencies. However, the NCSC still lacks the legislation, budget and capabilities that would allow it to transition into a signals intelligence service. A review of national security should make recommendations on whether this should be an ambition for the NCSC.

• Establish a ring-fenced budget within An Garda Síochána and expand civilian recruitment into the Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service.

Comment: A separate budget is vital for any intelligence service – this is again welcome. Although there is often a cross-over between serious organised crime investigation and intelligence (the Kinahan organised crime group’s connections with Iran’s intelligence services is a case in point), the objective of intelligence officers is to acquire intelligence to inform and ensure the security of the state. Prosecutions may come about as a result of the work of intelligence officers – but their functions and importance are much broader.

• Enact new Data Retention and interception law and include provision for over-the -top and encrypted services.
• Comment: A much-needed response to the warnings issued by Mr Justice Tony O’Connor, the judge appointed to review the use of communications interception legislation. Last July, Mr Justice O’ Connor urged the government to give gardaí the legal powers to access encrypted online messages, including on WhatsApp and social media, where there was a reasonable suspicion that a person or group may be involved in a violent, extremist plot or pose another serious threat to national security.
• Prioritise the regeneration and growth of Ireland’s Naval Service, including the Naval Reserve, with a focus on protecting our significant and expanding sub-sea data cabling infrastructure and emerging offshore energy sector.

Comment: The importance of the Naval Service has been underlined by increased Russian activity off the Irish coast and by Moscow’s use of its “shadow fleet” to target sub-sea cables. The launch of two European maritime missions, the Joint Expeditionary Force’s Operation Nordic Warden and NATO’s Baltic Sentinel, in recent days points to an urgent need for Ireland to invest in maritime capabilities and cooperate with its European partners on sub-sea protection.

• Establish a Cyber Security Centre of Excellence around a Cluster of Higher Education Institutions.

Comment: The intensification of such cyber partnerships is very welcome – a national Cyber Reserve of experts is critical to responding to Category One attacks on national infrastructure.

• Review military intelligence structures to ensure that our intelligence services are optimised to protect national security.

Comment: A welcome commitment – but, again, sequencing is important. Such an assessment of capabilities should complement rather than run parallel to a wider national security review. Although the majority of such a report will not be released due to operational security concerns, it may be possible to publish an executive summary to explain to the public the general role of military intelligence, its legal position and oversight.

 

And Finally…

This is the most ambitious national security programme for government this century. The devil, as always, will be in the details – such as the terms of reference and composition of a review on national security, the type and scale of future investment in the Naval Service, meeting pre-existing commitments under LOA 2 of the report of the Commission of the Defence Forces. However, considerable thought and attention has been brought to bear on national security. Individual representatives from the two main parties of government championed a more ambitious approach to national security. They are owed some gratitude for pressing their party colleagues on issues which are not traditionally front and centre of Irish politics. There is now an urgent opportunity to deliver a more robust national security infrastructure. It must not be wasted.